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On Judicial Intervention in Election
Administration
DANIEL P. TOKAJI*
This Article considers the relationship between the lower courts and the
Supreme Court in the field of election administration, focusing on the
Court's recent opinion in Purcell v. Gonzalez. It argues that the Supreme
Court should exercise exceptional restraint in this area given: (1) the
factual complexity of these cases, (2) the weighty democratic values on both
sides, (3) the unusual procedural context in which these cases tend to arise,
which often necessitate expedited consideration, and (4) the heated political
atmosphere that typically surrounds election administration disputes. The
Article begins by surveying the doctrinal and institutional changes resulting
from Florida 's 2000 election controversy and Bush v. Gore. It then looks to
the lower courts, assessing their handling of cases involving voting
technology and voter identification. In general, the lower courts have done
a capable-though certainly not perfect-job of handling the increased
election litigation filed since 2000. Finally, the Article discusses and
critiques Purcell, the one significant case since Bush in which the Supreme
Court has intervened The Court's troubling intervention in Purcell
illustrates why, as a general matter, election administration disputes are
better left to the lower courts. Particularly when it comes to hot-button
issues like voter identification that have a pronounced partisan valence,
such intervention threatens to distort equal protection doctrine and
undermine the Court's institutional credibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The incoherence of the Supreme Court's election law jurisprudence is a
recurring theme of this Symposium. Guy Charles, for example, describes the
Court's "futile quest to bring some coherence" to the law of partisan
gerrymandering,' while Rick Pildes alludes to the Court's "indecisive
floundering" in this area.2 Michael Kang observes that LULAC v. Perry
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1 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1185, 1185 (2007).
2 Richard H. Pildes, The Roberts Court and the Decline of Legally Mandated
Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2007).
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leaves "the law of partisan gerrymandering... as muddled as beforehand." 3
Similar criticisms dog the Supreme Court's decisions regarding campaign
finance regulation and come from both sides. Brad Smith notes the
"emptiness" of McConnell v. FEC,4 while Rick Hasen laments the "newer
incoherence" evident in the Supreme Court's case law culminating in
Randall v. Sorrell.5 Pam Karlan emphasizes the pronounced disagreement
within the Court on both political gerrymandering and campaign finance
regulation. 6 As she puts it: "The Court is not just divided; it is splintered." 7
This Article considers how such incoherence might be avoided in the
field of election administration, 8 in which the Supreme Court has been
relatively quiet since Bush v. Gore.9 In taking on this question, I endeavor to
follow Michael Solimine's wise suggestion that election law scholars attend
to the institutional role of the federal courts generally and the Supreme Court
in particular.' 0 I also draw on Ned Foley's thoughtful analysis of Bush v.
Gore and the lawsuits it has inspired.11
Although I am more sympathetic to Bush v. Gore's equal protection
reasoning than other commentators, 12 I believe it is a good thing that the
Supreme Court has, with one notable exception, left election administration
disputes to the lower courts since 2000. I also think that, for the most part,
the lower courts-especially federal district courts-have capably handled
the election administration litigation that has ensued. In some cases, they
3 Michel S. Kang, When Courts Won't Make Law: Judicial Paralysis and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2007).
4 Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, a New
Court Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 OHIO ST. L.J 891, 901 (2007).
5 Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and
Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 849
(2007).
6 Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68
OHIo ST. L.J. 743, 745 (2007).
7 1d.
8 By "election administration," I mean the set of nuts-and-bolts issues surrounding
the functioning of our election system, including registration, voting machines,
provisional ballots, voter identification, and recounts.
9 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
10 Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development
of Election Law in the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 767 (2007).
11 Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (2007).
12 See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2409, 2487-90 (2003). For a less
generous perspective on Bush v. Gore, see the authorities cited id. at 2487 n.424,
including Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gorefrom
Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REv. 170 (2001).
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have granted relief to plaintiffs that has prevented citizens' voting rights from
being violated. 13 Even where courts have not granted relief to plaintiffs, the
lower federal courts' intervention has played a productive role in clarifying
the law or spurring settlement. 14
The relative efficacy of the lower courts in handling these cases is partly
attributable to the hands-off approach taken by the Supreme Court, which has
for the most part steered clear of election administration since 2000. The one
significant exception exemplifies the hazards of the Supreme Court
intervening in election disputes. In Purcell v. Gonzalez,15 the Court issued an
opinion that demonstrated a failure to think carefully through the appropriate
role of the federal judiciary in election administration and threatens to distort
equal protection analysis of claims in the area. Although it is too soon to say
whether the Court's opinion will do long-term damage, Purcell provides a
cautionary lesson in the dangers of rushing to judgment on an unfamiliar
issue without recognizing the underlying political realities or the competing
democratic values at play. It also provides reason for worrying about what
the Court will do in the Indiana voter identification case, Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, for which certiorari was granted shortly before this
article went to press.
As the Court's performance in Purcell illustrates, several features of
election administration litigation call for particular restraint on the part of the
Supreme Court: (1) the fact-intensive character of most election
administration disputes, (2) the weighty democratic values at stake, (3) their
procedural posture, which often necessitates expedited consideration on an
incomplete record, and (4) the heated political atmosphere in which these
controversies tend to arise. These considerations suggest that the Court
would do best to allow a thorough percolation of election administration
issues in the lower courts rather than intervening as it did in Purcell. Such
intervention threatens to undermine the Court's institutional credibility,
particularly when it comes to hot-button issues like voter ID that have a
pronounced partisan valence. 16
13 I have previously discussed the constructive role of courts in cases surrounding
the 2004 election in Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206,
1220-39 (2005) [hereinafter "Early Returns"].
14 See id. at 1243; infra Part III.
15 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
16 See Solimine, supra note 10, at 70-71 (noting that judicial decision-making in
election law is "particularly ripe for the accusation of partisan or result-oriented
outcomes," making it "particularly important that the processes of judicial review are,
and be perceived as, non-partisan in nature").
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Part II reconsiders Bush v. Gore's impact, in terms of both shaping
doctrine and opening the courthouse doors. Part III focuses on the lower
court litigation regarding voting technology and voter identification,
probably the two most contentious election administration issues to emerge
since 2000. Part IV critically examines Purcell, a case that should caution
against aggressive Supreme Court intervention in future election
administration cases. As a general matter, I argue, the Court would be better
off leaving election administration to the lower courts.
II. Two FACES OF BUSH V. GORE
Professor Foley's contribution to this Symposium helpfully classifies the
various equal protection claims that have been made in lower courts since
Bush v. Gore.17 Without endeavoring to summarize or criticize his
taxonomy, 18 I describe here two different-though not necessarily
competing-ways in which to read the Court's holding in Bush v. Gore. The
first focuses on inter-jurisdictional equality, putting the case in the context of
the "one person, one vote" line of equal protection cases. The second focuses
on excessive administrative discretion, drawing on First Amendment cases
condemning imprecise schemes for regulating speech. I then explain why
Bush v. Gore may actually be less important for the doctrine(s) for which it
stands than for the symbolic opening of the federal court doors that it
represents.
As an initial matter, I reject the suggestion that Bush v. Gore should be
treated as sui generis, issuing a ruling that is unmoored to any larger legal
principle and good only for that case on that day.19 Such an interpretation
rests on the Court's statement that: "Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities." 20 This language, however,
warrants careful attention. The Court did not say that the broad equal
protection principle it articulated was inapplicable to other election processes
that might be challenged in the future. Instead, the Court's point was that
such issues were simply not before it. As stated in the next sentence: "The
question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their
expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections." 21 Such
17 Foley, supra note 11, at 9-25.
18 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007
(2007) (commenting on and providing an alternative to Foley's taxonomy).
19 See Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 886-89 (6th Cir. 2006) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting) (adopting a narrow application of Bush v. Gore).




issues not before the Court were left to be addressed (if at all) on another
day, perhaps by another court. To read Bush v. Gore as being grounded in no
constitutional principle, and therefore to have no precedential value
whatsoever, is antithetical to the rule of law.
How then should we interpret the Court's equal protection holding?
From a doctrinal perspective, there are at least two Bush v. Gores-that is,
two ways of understanding the underlying principle for which it stands.22
Both have found some currency in lawsuits brought since 2000.
The first and more common understanding of Bush v. Gore interprets the
case as articulating a rule against inter-jurisdictional inequality in the
administration of elections. This interpretation draws on Bush v. Gore's
citation to three "one [person], one vote" cases. 23 One of those cases was
Reynolds v. Sims, in which the Court held it to be a "fundamental principle of
representative government" that there should be equality of representation
without regard to "place of residence. ' 24 On this theory, the fundamental
problem with Florida's 2000 recount was the fact that different standards
were being applied in different counties, resulting in the differential
weighting of some of those counties' votes compared to others. 25
The most common form that this claim has taken is illustrated in the
federal cases brought in five states, challenging disparities arising from the
use of punch card voting equipment in some counties but not others. 26 This
22 See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 28, 48-50 (2004).
23 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)), 107
(citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814
(1969)).
24 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). This reading might also draw on
the anti-entrenchment rationale that lies at the heart of the "one person, one vote" cases.
The failure to redraw lines resulted in malapportioned districts that benefitted incumbents
in less populated, rural areas in states like Alabama. See Tokaji, First Amendment, supra
note 12, at 2484-85 (viewing the "one person, one vote" rule as a means by which to
prevent the political playing field from being tilted against certain groups); Heather K.
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Judicial Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr
and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (2002) (discussing the "lock-up" theory for
judicial intervention in malapportionment cases). So, too, the failure to replace unreliable
voting equipment might hold benefits for some incumbent legislators to the extent that
the other side's voters are disproportionately harmed by them.
25 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 106 (noting county-to-county variation in recount
standards).
26 For a description of these cases, see Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating
Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51
VILL. L. REV. 229, 278-94 (2006). See also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase:
Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1729-30 (2005)
(listing cases).
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first sort of claim might have been made even if Bush v. Gore had never been
decided. To the extent that Reynolds and its progeny forbid cross-county
inequalities in apportionment, it is no great stretch to argue that cross-county
inequalities in the counting of votes also present an equal protection problem.
In fact, the punch card cases arguably have more in common with Reynolds
than Bush, insofar as plaintiffs in both cases present evidence of statistically
demonstrable inequalities far stronger than what was available immediately
after the 2000 election. What Bush v. Gore adds-or at least clarifies-is the
idea that the principle of equal treatment to voters across counties may apply
to matters of election administration. 27 It does not, of course, explain
precisely how much inequality should be tolerated; but then neither did the
early "one person, one vote" cases. Rather, on this reading, Bush v. Gore
stands for a general principle of inter-jurisdictional equality in the
administration of elections, leaving it to future courts to ascertain the degree
of inequality that is constitutionally impermissible.
The other leading interpretation of Bush v. Gore is more institutional in
character, focusing on the excessive discretion vested in the local officials
charged with overseeing elections. On this reading, the fundamental problem
with which the Court was concerned was the possibility of partisan
manipulation arising from the absence of clear standards for conducting
manual recounts. I have elsewhere advanced this interpretation of Bush v.
Gore, likening it to First Amendment cases such as Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham,28 in which the Court struck down overly vague speech-
licensing schemes on the ground that they left too much discretion in the
hands of local officials, thereby facilitating the systematic suppression of
disfavored viewpoints. 29
The second interpretation of Bush v. Gore draws upon its emphasis on
"the absence of specific standards" for conducting a recount. Without such
standards, there was a pronounced danger that Florida law's general "intent
of the voter" standard might be manipulated by partisan election officials in
Florida's sixty-seven counties.30 Just as the absence of specific standards for
regulating speech once allowed local officials to suppress the political speech
of unions31 and civil rights demonstrators, 32 the absence of specific standards
27 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
28 394 U.S. 147, 150 (1969).
29 Tokaji, First Amendment, supra note 12, at 2488-90; see also Abner S. Greene, Is
There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v. Gore?, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1643,
1654-96 (2005); Pildes, supra note 22, at 49 n.100.
3 0 Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
31 Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 89 (1940).
32 Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 147.
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for counting votes would allow partisans to suppress the votes of those
favoring the other side's candidate.
Although cases focusing on excessive discretion in the administration of
elections have been less common, they more closely resemble the facts of
Bush v. Gore. One such case was Schering v. Blackwell, brought in an Ohio
federal court on November 2, 2004, the day of the general election. 33 The
complaint alleged that Ohio's failure to implement "specific standards" for
determining how provisional ballots should be counted violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 34 The case was reportedly brought at the behest of the
Republican Party,35 but was eventually dropped.36 A still-pending case that
relies on such a theory is League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell.37
The complaint in that case raises a number of different claims, but its
principal thrust is an attack on the State of Ohio's failure to articulate specific
standards governing its system of election administration. 38 As Professor
Foley notes, this could turn out to be among the most significant cases since
Bush v. Gore if it proceeds to judgment. 39
These two interpretations of Bush v. Gore are not mutually exclusive. In
fact, I have argued for both, the first as a litigator4° and the second as a
scholar.41 In the end, however, the most important ramification of Bush v.
Gore to date is probably not doctrinal. Even more significant is its signal that
33 For a description of Schering, see Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 13, at 1232-
33.
34 Complaint, Schering v. Blackwell, No. 1:04-cv-755 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2004),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/st-ohio.php.
35 Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 13, at 1233.
36 Stipulation of Dismissal, Schering v. Blackwell, No. 1:04-cv-755 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
15, 2005), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/st-ohio.php.
37 340 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
38 Complaint, League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, No. 3:05-cv-7309 (N.D. Ohio
July 28, 2005), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/ohio/LWV05/lwv-
complaint5.pdf.
39 Foley, supra note 11, at 943.
40 1 have served as an attorney for plaintiffs in three cases challenging punch card
voting equipment: Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 845 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated and
remanded as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Sw. Voter Registration Educ.
Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc); and Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
41 Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After Bush v. Gore, in THE FINAL ARBITER:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE FOR LAW AND POLITICS 107, 115-21 (David P.
Banks, David B. Cohen & John C. Green eds., 2005).
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the federal courts are open for business when it comes, to election
administration claims.42
That signal was clearly received, both by the parties and by citizen
groups. Since the 2000 election, there has been a significant increase in
election administration lawsuits. 43 Ohio alone saw litigation regarding a
number of subjects-including voting technology, registration, provisional
voting, voter identification, challenges to voter eligibility, and long lines at
the polls-around the time of the 2004 election.44 Of course, not.all of these
cases expressly rely on Bush v. Gore. In fact, some of the post-2000 litigation
is not constitutional at all, arising instead from disputes over the
interpretation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 ("HAVA") 45 or other
statutes, and would probably have been filed even if the Court had never
granted certiorari. Still, the Supreme Court's 2000 intervention is at least
partly responsible for the subsequent boom in election-related lawsuits, even
if the magnitude of Bush v. Gore's signaling effect is impossible to measure
with precision. As I explain in Part III, this has mostly been a good thing.
III. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
Post-Bush v. Gore litigation over election administration has had some
salutary effects. These lawsuits have, in some cases, resulted in favorable
judgments that protected voting rights.46 In other cases, they have advanced
reform through settlement or other means, despite plaintiffs' failure to secure
a favorable judgment. Even where those cases have been unsuccessful, as
with lawsuits challenging the refusal to count "wrong precinct" provisional
ballots in 2004, pre-election litigation has clarified the rules for voters,
parties, and election officials. 47 Particularly when such litigation is brought
well in advance of election day, it can help avoid messy and protracted post-
election litigation over who really won.
I do not here revisit all of the areas of election administration that have
generated lawsuits since 2000,48 but instead focus on the two most
contentious ones: voting technology and voter identification. These are the
42 As Professor Foley notes, Sam Issacharoff made this point at the Symposium. See
Foley, supra note 11, at 991.
43 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 957-58
(2005).
44 Tokaji, First Amendment, supra note 12, at 1220-39.
45 Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-
15545).
46 See Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 13, at 1230-31, 1234-36, 1238-39.
47 Id. at 1246.
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areas that have provided the most fertile ground for litigation. On the whole,
the lower courts have done a respectable-though certainly not perfect-job
of handling these cases. Even where plaintiffs have not obtained a judgment
in their favor, this litigation has often had beneficial consequences. These
conclusions are necessarily somewhat impressionistic and, no doubt,
influenced by my own views regarding the merits of the disputes addressed
below. But even if one does not share that perspective, a careful study of
these cases provides at least some reason for optimism regarding the lower
courts' ability to handle the many election administration cases that have
emerged since 2000.49
A. Voting Technology
The first wave of post-Bush lawsuits focused mainly on voting
equipment, primarily the unreliable "hanging chad" punch card voting
systems used in Florida and many other parts of the country. Wielding strong
statistical evidence that this equipment resulted in more lost votes than other
systems,50 civil rights advocates filed cases challenging this equipment in
five states: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, California, and Ohio.51 All of these
cases rely on the inter-jurisdictional equality interpretation of Bush v. Gore
and the "one person, one vote" cases that it cited. Lower courts have arrived
at a fair and administrable constitutional standard, and these cases, moreover,
have effected change by way of settlement. More recently, a second wave of
voting technology cases, this one challenging electronic voting equipment,
has emerged. Although these cases have met with somewhat less success so
far, this is not due to confusion in the lower courts over the law that should
be applied. It is instead the consequence of evidentiary shortcomings in the
plaintiffs' proof. On the whole, the lower courts have capably handled the
voting technology litigation before them, without the need for Supreme Court
intervention.
In the first wave of post-Bush voting equipment litigation, the Illinois
and California cases quickly yielded favorable opinions for those challenging
48 See id. at 1220-39. Professor Foley's article provides a helpful survey of the post-
Bush constitutional litigation. See Foley, supra note 11, at 976-80.
49 For a less optimistic view of the impact of the litigation that has followed Bush v.
Gore, see Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming Oct. 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=976701.
50 See Saphire & Moke, supra note 26.
51 Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 13, at 1210 n.26.
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punch cards.52 The district courts in both cases concluded that the inter-
county variations arising from the use of punch card voting equipment in
some counties but not others stated a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. Both courts also concluded that the disproportionate impact on
minority voters was held sufficient to state a claim under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. These two cases, along with the Florida case, ultimately
resulted in settlements that effectively ended the use of punch card voting
equipment. 53 Only the Ohio litigation proceeded to trial. The district court
entered judgment for the state after a trial, in an opinion that deals with the
constitutional standard only in cursory fashion.54 However, as explained
below, that judgment was later reversed by a panel of the Sixth Circuit and
ultimately vacated as moot by the en banc court.
There have been opinions from two appellate panels holding that the use
of punch card voting equipment violates the Equal Protection Clause: one
from the Ninth Circuit in Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v.
Shelley ("SVREP")55 and the other from the Sixth Circuit in Stewart v.
Blackwell.56 Although both panel opinions were ultimately vacated by en
banc courts, which ultimately disposed of the appeals on procedural grounds,
they both warrant attention since they represent the most sustained treatment
of the Equal Protection Clause's application to voting equipment disparities.
The SVREP case challenged California's use of punch card voting
machines in its October 2003 recall election. After the district court had
denied plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion, a three-judge panel issued
an injunction postponing California's recount election until after the
replacement of punch card voting machines, scheduled for March 2004. The
Ninth Circuit panel relied not only on Bush v. Gore, but also on the "one
person, one vote" cases, culling from them "the basic principle of
representative government... [that] the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be
52 Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Common Cause v.
Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
53 Consent Decree and Final Judgment, Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470,
2002 WL 1766410 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2002); Order Approving Settlement, Black v.
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Order, NAACP v. Harris, No.
OICV120 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2002). The Georgia case became moot when Georgia
adopted new voting equipment. See Suggestion of Mootness by Plaintiffs, Andrews v.
Cox, No. 2001CV32490 (Ga. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002); email from Neil Bradley, ACLU
Voting Rights Project, to Dan Tokaji, (Feb. 22, 2007, 10:09:00 EST) (on file with
author).
54 Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
55 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
56 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), superseded by 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en
banc), vacating as moot 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
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made to depend on where he lives. '57 That opinion, however, was ultimately
vacated by the en banc court, which affirmed the district court's decision to
deny a preliminary injunction. Instead of squarely addressing the equal
protection claim on its merits, the en banc court relied on the district court's
discretion in weighing competing harms on a preliminary injunction motion,
as well as the undesirability of enjoining an election that had by then already
begun, due to some voters' having already cast absentee ballots. On the
merits of plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the en banc Ninth Circuit had
little to say, conclusorily stating simply that the question was "one over
which reasonable jurists may differ," and thus that the "district court did not
abuse its discretion in holding that the plaintiffs have not established a clear
probability of success on the merits. '58 While one might criticize the en banc
court for ducking the constitutional issue, the result is defensible. If the Ninth
Circuit opinion did not clarify the law, it did not muddy it either.
In the Ohio litigation, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit also held that
the use of punch card voting machines in some counties but not others
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Like the Ninth Circuit panel in SVREP,
the Stewart v. Blackwell majority relied on the evidence of the higher
likelihood of ballots not being counted in counties using punch card voting
equipment. 59 And like the SVREP panel, the Sixth Circuit panel found a
principle of inter-jurisdictional equality in Bush v. Gore and the "one person,
one vote" line of cases upon which it relied. In condemning the inter-
jurisdictional inequalities arising from disparities in voting equipment, the
Stewart panel quoted Reynolds' language providing that "the weight of a
citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives."'60 As in the
Ninth Circuit, however, the panel opinion was short-lived. The Sixth Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc and, in January 2007, issued an order finding the
case to be moot due to Ohio's replacement of its punch cards in 2006.61 This
order terminated the last of the first-wave voting technology cases.
Although punch cards are now virtually extinct, there are likely to be
more lawsuits challenging voting technology under the Equal Protection
Clause. As counties began to move away from paper-based systems, like the
punch card, to direct record electronic ("DRE") systems after 2000, some
advocates and computer scientists began to worry about the security risks
57 Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 895 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964)).
58 Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
59 Stewart, 444 F.3d at 862-67.
60 Id. at 866 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964)).
61 Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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associated with this relatively new form of voting technology. 62 This
prompted a second wave of post-Bush voting technology cases challenging
the use of paperless electronic voting machines. As in the punch card cases,
plaintiffs rested their cases on inter-county disparities in the equipment used,
but, so far, these cases have met with little success. In Weber v. Shelley, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the Sequoia electronic voting equipment
used in Riverside County, finding no evidence that this equipment was less
reliable than other equipment used in the state.63 And in Wexler v. Anderson,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected Florida voters' challenge to electronic voting
equipment used in that state, also finding no evidence that voters in those
counties were less likely to have their votes counted.64 In both cases, the
courts concluded that no "severe" burden on the right to vote had been
proven and, therefore, strict scrutiny of the challenged practice need not be
applied.65
At first glance, there might appear to be inconsistency between the now-
vacated panel opinions in SVREP and Stewart on the one hand, and those in
Weber and Wexler on the other. While the former cases found an equal
protection violation arising from the use of punch card voting equipment, the
latter two rejected equal protection claims arising from the use of paperless
voting technology. A closer look at the rationale of these cases, however,
shows the differences to be more apparent than real. Where the cases differ is
not in the legal rule they apply, but in their facts.
The post-Bush election technology cases all recognize that impediments
to the right to vote may sometimes warrant searching judicial review. As the
Court stated in Reynolds: "Especially since the right to exercise the franchise
in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."'66 At the same time, these cases
recognize that not every election practice with an incidental impact on
participation triggers strict scrutiny. This is consistent with the analytic
framework set forth in Burdick v. Takushi,67 under which "severe"
restrictions on voting rights must satisfy strict scrutiny while "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory" ones may be upheld if they are justified by the states'
62 I discuss these issues in depth in Tokaji, Paperless Chase, supra note 26, at 1734-
37, 1773-94.
63 Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003).
64 Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1232 n.9 (11 th Cir. 2006).
65 Id. at 1233; Weber, 347 F.3d at 1106.
66 377 U.S. at 562; see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966) (noting that restrictions on fundamental rights must be "closely scrutinized and
carefully confined").
67 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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"important regulatory interests. '68 Burdick is far afield from all the post-Bush
cases on its facts, having to do with a prohibition on write-in voting rather
than the administration of elections. Still, the analysis applied in the lower
courts comports with its framework.
In SVREP and Stewart, the panels found statistically demonstrable, inter-
county disparities arising from the use of punch cards. 69 By contrast, in the
electronic voting cases, no such statistical disparities were proven. 70 Relying
on Burdick's framework, the Weber and Wexler courts concluded that the
election practices challenged fell into the "reasonable, nondiscriminatory"
category that is not subject to strict scrutiny rather than the "severe" category
that is.71 It was precisely on this basis that the Wexler court distinguished the
panel opinion in Stewart, which at that time was still in effect, noting that the
Florida plaintiffs had not even alleged the sort of inter-county disparities
which the Ohio plaintiffs had proven.72 As the district court in Black v.
McGuffage aptly put it, the operative question is whether the state is using
voting equipment with "substantially different levels of accuracy. ' 73 If such
disparities are shown, then strict scrutiny should be applied.
A close reading of these opinions thus confirms that the lower courts are
largely in accord as to the legal test that should govern equal protection
68 Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
69 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), superseded by 473 F.3d 692
(6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), vacating as moot 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(discussing statistical evidence demonstrating higher percentage of residual votes with
punch cards); Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).
70 Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1232 ("[P]laintiffs, however, did not plead that voters in
touchscreen counties are less likely to cast effective votes .... ); Weber, 347 F.3d at
1105 (noting lack of evidence that challenged electronic voting machines were less
accurate than other systems).
71 Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1232-33; Weber, 347 F.3d at 1106.
72 Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1233. The events surrounding the 2006 election for Florida's
13th congressional district might arguably strengthen such a claim. In that race,
Republican Vern Buchanan defeated Democrat Christine Jennings by a mere 369 votes.
See Rachel Kapochunas, Democrat's Challenge in Fla. 13 Focuses on Undervotes,
CQ.CoM, Nov. 20, 2006, at page number, http://www.cqpolitics.com/
2006/11 /democratschallengein fla 13.html (discussing higher undervote rate in
Sarasota County). In Sarasota County, however, there were more than 18,000
electronically-cast ballots on which no vote was recorded for that office-a much higher
percentage of undervotes than is commonly seen. Id. Still, it is doubtful this incident will
support a broad-based challenge to electronic voting technology, given the likelihood that
poor ballot design was responsible for the large number of undervotes. See Lauren Frisina
et al., Ballot Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006 Midterm
Elections in Florida (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.dartmouth.edu/-herron/cdl 3.pdf.
73 Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
2007) 1077
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
challenges to voting equipment. 74 To the extent they reached different
conclusions, they did so based not on differing interpretations of Bush v.
Gore or the equal protection cases that came before it, but instead upon
differences in the evidence that had been presented. The en banc dispositions
in the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit also create no conflict in law, since
those decisions rested on procedural issues rather than the merits-mootness
in the case of Stewart, and the impropriety of enjoining a pending election in
SVREP. On the whole, the lower courts have faithfully applied the Supreme
Court's equal protection precedents, including but not limited to Bush v.
Gore, to alleged disparities arising from voting technology.
On a practical level, these cases have had important effects. Even where
there was no published opinion in plaintiffs' favor, they have spurred the
prompt elimination of antiquated voting equipment. While the precise impact
of Bush v. Gore is impossible to measure, the opinion was at the least a
contributing factor in these developments. The possibility of equal protection
litigation may also turn out to have a salutary effect in the implementation of
new voting technology, deterring election officials from using equipment that
may have unequal effects or be susceptible to partisan manipulation. It has
not proven necessary for the Court to intervene in order for its opinion in
Bush v. Gore to promote election administration reform, and there seems
little compelling reason for it to do so at this time.
B. Voter Identification
Along with voting technology, voter identification is the area of election
administration that has received the greatest attention and been the subject of
the most significant litigation since 2000. 75 The rationale generally provided
for imposing ID requirements is that they are needed in order to ensure
election integrity and, more specifically, to prevent the fraudulent
impersonation of registered voters. The need for voter ID was a topic of
considerable debate in Congress prior to HAVA's enactment, which focused
largely on the tension between access and integrity.76 The bill that finally
passed included a limited identification requirement, applicable only to first-
time voters who registered by mail. 77 This requirement may be satisfied by
presenting either photo ID or a document showing the voter's name and
74 1 here put aside the en banc dispositions in Stewart and SVREP which, as noted
above, rest principally (and in the case of Stewart entirely) on procedural issues rather
than the merits of plaintiffs' equal protection claims.
75 For a thorough assessment of the legal and policy issues surrounding voter ID, see
Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MIC. L. REV. 631 (2006).
76 See Tokaji, Early Returns, supra note 13, at 1213.
77 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
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current address, such as a utility bill, bank statement, paycheck, or
government document. 78 In addition, voters are exempt from the ID
requirement if, at the time they registered, they provided certain identifying
information. 79
Since HAVA's enactment, several states have moved to impose more
demanding voter ID requirements. 80 Three Republican-dominated state
legislatures (Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri) have enacted laws requiring
voters to present a government-issued photo ID at the polls to have their
votes counted.81 Several other states have adopted laws that require all those
voting at the polls to present some form of non-photographic identification.
One of those states is Arizona, whose voters passed an initiative in 2004
requiring voters to present either one form of photo ID or two forms of non-
photo ID bearing the voter's name and current address. 82 Another is Ohio,
which enacted an exceptionally convoluted voter ID requirement in 2006.83
Voting rights advocates have challenged voter ID laws under both the
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Bush v. Gore is of tangential
relevance in facial challenges to voter ID, though it has greater relevance in
as-applied challenges. Plaintiffs' strongest facial challenge relies primarily
on the Supreme Court's 1966 opinion in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,84 in which the Supreme Court struck down a $1.50 poll tax on
equal protection grounds. Although the poll tax was often used to
disenfranchise blacks in southern states like Virginia, Justice Douglas'
opinion for the Court did not expressly rest on a finding of race
discrimination. In a footnote the Court expressly declined to address whether
the state's poll tax was used to stop African Americans from voting.85
Rather, the Court found there to be a constitutional violation in the heavier
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 15483(b)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
79 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
80 For a summary of state voter ID requirements, see electionline.org, Voter ID
Laws, http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364 (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
81 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2003 & Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5
(West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). Florida also enacted
a law requiring voters to present photo ID, but voters who do not have such ID may cast
provisional ballots which may be counted even if photo ID is not presented. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 101.043, 101.048 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
82 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-579(A) (West 2003).
83 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.18 (West 2006). For a description, see Daniel P.
Tokaji & Chad Eggspuehler, Voter Identification Requirements in Ohio,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/proceduresrules03.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2007).
84 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
85 Id. at 666 n.3.
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burden that the law imposed on citizens of limited means: "We conclude that
a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard."'86 The poll tax warranted heightened scrutiny because of
the relatively greater burden that it imposed upon people of lesser means.
87
Significantly, the Court did not insist upon empirical evidence showing that
the poll tax would disproportionately affect any particular group of voters.
The Harper-based facial attack on photo ID analogizes it to a poll tax.
This argument is strongest in cases where the state actually charges a fee for
the government-issued photo ID that is needed to vote. A Georgia district
court enjoined a photo ID requirement that the state legislature enacted in
2005 on this ground under both the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth
Amendments. As the court noted in Common Cause v. Billups,88 Georgia had
actually increased its fees for photo ID at the time it enacted this law, up to
twenty dollars for a five-year card and thirty-five dollars for a ten-year
card.89 Requiring a fee in order to obtain an ID that is in turn required to vote
is the practical equivalent of a poll tax.
After the district court's initial ruling in Common Cause v. Billups,
Georgia amended its law in 2006 to allow ID to be obtained free of charge.
Such a change did not, however, eliminate the constitutional doubt regarding
voter ID requirements under Harper.90 For one thing, the underlying
documents-such as a birth certificate or driver's license-may still cost
money. Moreover, even if these documents were provided free of charge,
requiring voters to obtain a photo ID still imposes a tax on the voters' time.
Someone who lacks a driver's license would have to wait in line once to get a
photo ID card, only to face the prospect of waiting in another line when
86 Id. at 666.
87 As the Court put it at the end of its opinion:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. Those principles
apply here. For to repeat, wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting
qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned.
Id. at 670 (citations omitted).
88 Common Cause v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
89 Id. at 1337.
90 The text that follows appears in substantially similar form in Daniel P. Tokaji, ID
and the Right to Vote, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/050412.php
(Apr. 12, 2005), and Daniel P. Tokaji, Indiana Photo ID Lawsuit,




Election Day arrives. It would thus increase the burden on those who wish to
vote or, put another way, impose a tax on some voters' time. Even if only a
small percentage of eligible voters are discouraged by an ID requirement,
that will still be enough to swing some elections. As recent elections from
Florida to Washington demonstrate, a few votes can sometimes make a big
difference.
There is also evidence that, like the poll tax struck down in Harper, a
photo ID requirement will not burden all components of the polity equally. A
study prepared for the Carter-Baker election reform commission in 2001
found that approximately six to ten percent of the American electorate lacks
official state identification. 91 Although there is relatively little empirical
evidence on the characteristics of voters who lack ID, a Wisconsin study
found stark disparities based on race and other characteristics. 92 Not
surprisingly, racial minorities and poor people were most likely to lack
driver's licenses. Statewide, eighty-five percent of white adults had a driver's
license.93 By contrast, less than half of the African Americans and Latinos in
Milwaukee County possessed a license. 94 The disparities were even more
stark for young black males, with only twenty-six percent of Milwaukee
County's African American men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
four possessing a license.95 Even though the Harper court did not require
such statistical evidence of disparate impact in order to uphold a challenge to
the poll tax, this type of evidence supports the idea that photo ID
requirements will impose comparably unequal burdens on poor and minority
voters. The problem for those seeking to challenge voter ID laws is that it is
difficult to prove that such laws will have a disparate impact on participation,
even if there are reasons for believing that it may.96
All three state laws requiring photo ID in order to vote have faced legal
challenges. In Missouri, lawsuits challenging the state's photo ID law were
91 John Mark Hansen, Verification of Identity, in To ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, TASK FORCE REPORTS TO ACCOMPANY THE
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION REFORM 4 (2001), available at
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/fulltf report.pdf.
92 John Pawasarat, THE DRIVERS LICENSE STATUS OF THE VOTING AGE POPULATION
IN WISCONSIN (2005), http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/ETI/barriers/DriversLicense.pdf (last
visited Oct. 28, 2007).
93 Id. at 1.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2.
96 See Timothy Vercellotti & David Anderson, Protecting the Franchise or
Restricting It? The Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout (2006),
available at http://www.eagleton.rutgers.edu/News-Research/VoterIDTumout.pdf
(finding that stricter voter identification requirements reduced voter turnout by three to
four percent).
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likewise filed in both state and federal court.97 In October 2006, the Missouri
Supreme Court issued an opinion in Weinschenk v. Missouri,98 which
effectively put an end to the matter, holding that the law violated the state's
equal protection clause.
On the other hand, Georgia's and Indiana's photo ID laws have thus far
survived legal challenge. A lawsuit was filed against Georgia's 2006 ID law
in state court.99 In September 2006, the Superior Court issued a permanent
injunction against the law, holding that it violated the Georgia Constitution's
guarantee of the right to vote.100 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed on
standing grounds, finding that the plaintiff actually had a form of ID that
would be acceptable under the law. l0 ' The federal district court in Common
Cause v. Georgia preliminarily enjoined both the 2005 and 2006 ID laws on
grounds that they likely violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' 02 After trial,
however, the district court granted judgment in the state's favor. 10 3 The
district court held that plaintiffs lacked standing, given their failure to show
that the law would prevent any of them from voting. 10 4 In dicta, the court
went on to conclude that it would decline to grant a permanent injunction
even if it had jurisdiction. 10 5 With both the federal and state cases thrown out
97 Complaint, NAACP v. Camahan, No. 06-4200 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2006),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/MO-
FedlDComplaint.pdf; Petition for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Class Action Relief,
Jackson County v. State, No. 06AC-CC00587 (Cole County Cir. Ct. July 17, 2006),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Petitionfor
DeclaratorylnjunctiveandClassActionRelief.pdf; Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201
(2006).
98 Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
99 Complaint, Lake v. Perdue, No. 2006CV 119207 (Fulton County Super. Ct. July 3,
2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
LakeVerifiedComplaint.pdf.
100 Order on Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Lake v.
Perdue, No. 2006CV1 19207 (Fulton County Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlawilitigation/documents/Statelnjunction.pdf.
101 Perdue v. Lake, 647 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 2007).
102 Common Cause v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
103 Common Cause v. Billups, No. 4:05-CV-0201-HLM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68950 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2007).
104 Id. at *101-12.
105 Id. at * 134 (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection challenge due to their failure to




for lack of standing, the law took effect in September 2007,106 though its
constitutionality remains uncertain.
Indiana's law is somewhat different from those enacted in Georgia and
Missouri, in that voters who cannot afford photo ID are given an alternative
option. They may cast a provisional ballot at the polls and, within ten days
after the election, are required to complete an affidavit of indigency. 0 7
Voters cannot complete this affidavit at the polls, but must instead make a
separate trip to the board of elections. Although it is difficult to see any good
reason for such a requirement other than to make it more difficult for some
people to vote, a federal district court granted the State's motion for
summary judgment,108 and a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed in
an opinion discussed below in Part IV. 109
Of the states that have enacted non-photo ID laws, two stand out as
particularly significant. One of them is Arizona, the one state in which the
Supreme Court has thus far intervened, as detailed below in Part IV. The
other is Ohio, in which advocates challenged the implementation of that
state's photo ID law based on Bush v. Gore and other equal protection cases.
Ohio's experience is noteworthy in several respects, including the legislative
decision not to require photo ID, the legal theory embraced by those
challenging the law that was ultimately enacted, and the admirable manner in
which it was handled by the district court.
One of the curiosities of Ohio's experience with voter ID is that the state
chose not to go the way of Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri. Despite the fact
that Republicans dominated the state legislature and held control of the
Governor's office in 2005, the omnibus election bill that was enacted in 2005
(House Bill 3) did not require voters to show government-issued photo ID in
order to have their votes counted. Instead, the law allows various forms of
non-photo ID, similar to those permitted by HAVA. l l0 Although it is always
difficult to determine why a legislature chooses not to include a particular
provision in a bill, the legislative hearings (in which I testified against a
photo ID requirement 11) suggest that the prospect of a legal challenge was at
least partly responsible. In particular, the state senate committee that held
106 Eric Stirgus, Voter Photo ID: Few Problems Seen, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Sept. 20, 2007, at Bi.
107 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-11.7-5-1, 3-11.7-5-2.5 (West 2006).
108 Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
109 Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). As
discussed below, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. 168 L. Ed. 2d 809.
110 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3505.18 (West 2006).
11l Testimony of Daniel P. Tokaji, Ohio Senate Rules Comm., Sub. H.B. 3, June 15,
2005, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/SubH.B.3Test-
SenRules.pdf.
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hearings on the bill seemed very concerned about the prospect of litigation
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, challenging the likely disparate impact
that a photo ID law would have on minority voters.
Shortly before the 2006 general elections, a homeless advocacy group
and labor union brought suit to challenge the manner in which Ohio's voter
ID law was being implemented. 112 The equal protection theory in Northeast
Ohio Coalition for the Homeless ("NEOCH") v. Blackwell is intriguing
because it rests largely on variations arising from the discretion vested in
local election officials. 113 The case thus brought into play the second reading
of Bush v. Gore, described in Part II, that focused on excessive
administrative discretion.
At the core of the complaint was that key parts of Ohio's ID law were
"confusing, vague and impossible to apply." 1 4 It further asserts that parts of
this bill impose an "unequal and undue burden" on the right to vote. 115 The
main focus of the lawsuit was upon inconsistencies in how H.B. 3 would be
applied within different Ohio counties. In particular, plaintiffs identify
several portions of the new law that were being applied differently within
different Ohio counties. Among the inter-county disparities alleged were the
following:
* Under Ohio's ID law, one acceptable form of identification is a
"current" utility bill, bank statement, or other document.
Plaintiffs alleged that Ohio law failed to define the term
"current" and that different counties were applying different
rules for ascertaining whether the documents presented were
acceptable.
* That same provision also refers to "other government
document[s]" that suffice to meet the identification requirement.
Plaintiffs alleged that county boards of election were applying
different standards for determining what this term includes. For
example, Cuyahoga County allegedly was accepting any type of
112 Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter "NEOCH v. Blackwell"]. Papers from this case are available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/NEOCHv.Blackwell.php.
113 Much of my description of the claims in NEOCH v. Blackwell is drawn from a
post on my "Equal Vote" blog. Equal Vote, Ohio Voter ID Lawsuit,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2006/10/ohio-voter-id-lawsuit.html (Oct. 24, 2006,
16:23 EST).
114 See generally Complaint, NEOCH v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896 (S.D. Ohio Oct.





document from any U.S., city, state, or county government
entity, while other counties only accepted state or federal
documents.
" Ohio's law allows absentee voters to provide their driver's
license number instead of ID. But there were actually two
different numbers on Ohio driver's licenses-one larger number
appearing over the driver's photo, and another smaller number
buried on the left-hand side. Mahoning County was allegedly
rejecting absentee ballots that have only the first number, while
Cuyahoga was counting those ballots.
* Under Ohio's ID law, military ID is an acceptable form of
identification if it shows the voter's name and "current address."
The complaint alleged that some military ID cards do not contain
the holder's address. Mahoning and Trumbull Counties were
allegedly rejecting military ID cards without the voter's current
address, while Cuyahoga was accepting them.
* The complaint also asserted that the Secretary of State's office
had failed to provide adequate guidance to county boards of
elections, and that the guidance that had been issued "cause[d]
more rather than less confusion" on some issues.
Just days before the 2006 election, U.S. District Judge Algenon Marbley
issued a temporary restraining order barring the application of Ohio's new ID
requirements to absentee voters.11 6 Judge Marbley found that various parts of
Ohio's ID law were "vague" and were being unequally applied by state
boards of election. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit, however, stayed
Judge Marbley's order. 1 17 This stay threatened to cause more disruption than
it resolved. In particular, it threw into doubt what would happen to the
absentee ballots that had been cast during the period that Judge Marbley's
order was in effect, at which time voters could reasonably have believed that
116 Temporary Restraining Order, NEOCH v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
nochordergrantingTRO.pdf.
117 Amended Order, NEOCH v. Blackwell, Nos. 06-4412, 06-4421 (6th Cir. 2006)
(order granting evidentiary hearing), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH%20amended%20order/o20from%20sixth%20
circuit.pdf; see also NEOCH v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining
reasons for stay).
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the ID requirements did not apply to them. 118 Only the diligent efforts of
Judge Marbley and the attorneys for both sides forestalled a potential post-
election crisis. After thirteen hours of intensive negotiations overseen by the
court, the parties agreed to a consent order on November 1-the Wednesday
before the election-prescribing detailed ID guidelines for both absentee
ballots and those cast at the polling place. 119
Perhaps even more importantly, the resolution of NEOCH case is a
reminder of the valuable role that the federal courts can play. District courts
are especially well-positioned to gauge the impact of such laws and to
fashion appropriate pre-election relief-or encourage a settlement that will
clarify the rules of the game. Such judicial intervention is not evident from
reading the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement, but can have a
significant impact on the administration of elections. Furthermore, the threat
of a lawsuit can serve as a deterrent to state legislatures enacting potentially
problematic laws.
IV. THE CASE FOR RESTRAINT: PURCELL V. GONZALEZ
The voting technology and voter ID cases described in Part III suggest
that the lower court litigation on these issues has had beneficial effects. In the
case of voting technology, a rough consensus has emerged over the legal
standard that should govern such cases. In the case of voter ID, there is
greater reason for questioning the dispositions reached, but the lower courts
have generally demonstrated an appropriate attention to the evidence. In both
areas, moreover, there have been settlements that improved the
administration of elections without the need to go to trial. Of course, the
lower courts are not perfect. They do not always do a thorough job of sifting
through the evidence, translating four-decade-old precedents to new
circumstances, or crafting remedies. But the cases I have described should
provide at least some reason for confidence in the lower courts' ability to
handle the complex legal and factual issues that have arisen with increased
frequency in the administration of elections.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Supreme Court. The
Court's one significant intervention in election administration since 2000,
118 For discussion of this issue, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Sixth Circuit Stays Ohio TRO,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edulblogs/tokaji/2006/10/sixth-circuit-stays-ohio-tro.html (Oct. 30,
2006, 09:48 EST).
119 Consent Order, NEOCH v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2006)
(agreeing to act in accordance with consent order), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCHConsentOrd.pdf; see
also Mark Niquette & Kevin Mayhood, Parties Settle Voter ID Lawsuit, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 2, 2006, at Al; Julie Carry Smyth, Voter ID Dispute Settled in Talks,
AKRON BEACON-JOURNAL, Nov. 2, 2006, at Al.
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Purcell v. Gonzalez, can most charitably be described as careless. 120 This
case provides a worrisome sign for those hoping for an evenhanded and
thorough consideration of the competing values surrounding voter ID and
other politically charged election administration issues.
To be fair, it should be noted that the lower courts in Purcell failed to
handle the matter with the care for which one would hope. 121 The case
involved a challenge to provisions of Arizona's Proposition 200, including its
ID requirements described in Part III. The problems started with the district
court, whose denial of a preliminary injunction the Supreme Court eventually
upheld. The district court conducted a hearing on plaintiffs' preliminary
injunction motion on August 30 and 31, 2006. This schedule ought to have
allowed plenty of time for an order to issue and for an orderly appellate
process before the November 2006 election. On September 11, the district
court issued a brief order denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction against Proposition 200's identification requirements. 122 But the
district court did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
of its order at that time. Those findings and conclusions did not appear until a
month later-and less than a month before the election-on October 12.123
By that time, the Ninth Circuit had already ruled on plaintiffs'
"emergency and urgent" motion for an injunction pending appeal, which had
been filed on September 23.124 On October 5, a two-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit issued a brief order granting the emergency motion and enjoining
Proposition 200's registration and identification requirements pending the
120 See generally Bob Bauer, The United States Supreme Court at the Polls, in
Arizona: The More Things Change... (Oct. 21, 2006),
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/updates/election-administration.html?AID=844.
Though the thoughts on Purcell in the text below are my own, my thinking benefitted
from reading Mr. Bauer's analysis.
121 The description of Purcell below appears in substantially similar form in my
"Equal Vote" blog. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Supreme Court's Arizona Intervention,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2006/1 0/supreme-courts-arizona-intervention.html
(Oct. 23, 2006, 17:15:00 EST).
122 Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, Gonzalez v. State, No. CV 06-1268-
PHX-ROS (D. Az. Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
litigation/documents/arizonaorder9-11-06.pdf.
123 Order Denying motion to Expedite, Gonzalez v. State, No. CV 06-1268-PHX-
ROS (D. Az. Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
litigation/documents/AZfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflaw.pdf.
124 Motion of Petitioner-Appellants, Gonzalez v. State, No. CV 06-1268-PHX-ROS
(9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation
/documents/ITCA-9-28-O6Emergencyand UrgentMotionforlnjunctionPendingAppeal.pdf.
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election. 125 Like the district court's original order denying an injunction, the
Ninth Circuit's order did not explain its reasoning. It would certainly have
been preferable for the Ninth Circuit to have issued some explanation of its
rationale, at least after the district -court finally issued its findings and
conclusions on October 12.
Thus, by the time the matter got up to the Supreme Court, the lower
courts had already handled the litigation in a less-than-exemplary fashion. It
does not, however, follow that it was necessary or appropriate for the
Supreme Court to intervene. The Court might have waited for additional
action from the Ninth Circuit, which had had only a few days to consider the
district court's findings and conclusions. The Court might also have given
the en banc Ninth Circuit an opportunity to overrule the panel. Lastly, if the
Court had felt it absolutely necessary to correct the Ninth Circuit, the Court
might have issued a brief order vacating the injunction and remanding with
instructions for reconsideration in light of the district court's findings and
conclusions. This would have been an appropriately restrained response
under the circumstances, given that district court findings on the balance of
hardships are entitled to deference on appeal. By issuing a short order
requiring the Ninth Circuit to consider the district court's finding, the Court
might have avoided enmeshing itself in the merits.
Instead, the Court compounded the errors of the lower courts, issuing a
per curiam opinion that does more to confuse than to clarify, despite its
invocation of the need for "clear guidance."'1 26 The Court was right to note
that "[c]onfidence" in the integrity of elections is important. 127 It was also
right to say that any assessment of the constitutionality of voter ID rules
requires consideration of both the state's interests in preventing voter fraud
and the voter's interests in not being turned away or having their votes
rejected. Where the Court's reasoning goes awry is in its abbreviated but
distressing analysis of the arguments made by each side.
As an initial matter, the Court's cursory analysis of the constitutional
issue proceeds in backwards fashion. The conventional approach to equal
protection questions is to first analyze the burden on plaintiffs' protected
interests. In a voting case, that means showing an infringement upon the right
to vote. If a sufficiently serious infringement of the right to vote is
established, then the defendant is required to show that its action is narrowly
125 Order Granting Emergency Motion for Injunction, Gonzalez v. State, No. 06-
16706 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/06-16706_000.pdf.
126 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006).
127 Id. at 7.
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tailored to serve compelling government interests. 128 Instead of following
this conventional analysis, the Court started at the back, asserting that the
state has a "compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election
process."'129 Perhaps this should be taken as an indication, or at least an
assumption, that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for judging
Arizona's ID law, but the Court's opinion is not clear on this point.
Much more troubling is the Court's discussion of the state's purported
interests. Without any pretense of evidence, the Court asserts that "[v]oter
fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process ... ". 130 Yet the
Court fails to identify any evidence of significant fraud-or for that matter,
of any fraud-in Arizona's election system that the state's ID requirement
would stop. It certainly did not identify any evidence to support its
presumption that such fraud, if it existed, would deter "honest citizens" from
voting. Instead, the Court relies on a misguided comparison between voters'
perceptions that elections are filled with fraud and vote dilution. According
to the Court: "Voters who fear [that] their legitimate votes will be
outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised."' 13 1 But to the extent
that this is true-and again, the Court offers no evidence to support its
assertion-any "disenfranchisement" is of their own making. It is a result of
their own decision not to vote.
The Court goes on to compare the fear of fraud that presumably underlies
Arizona's law to violations of the "one person, one vote" rule articulated in
Reynolds v. Sims. 132 This is a false comparison. In Reynolds, for example, the
Court was faced with malapportioned legislative districts that gave some
counties' votes a fraction of the weight of others, by as much as a 41:1
margin. Contemporary allegations of voting fraud, though seldom
quantified, 133 are not remotely comparable to Reynolds or even to subsequent
cases finding "one person, one vote" violations with smaller variances. 134
Perhaps this is devoting greater attention to the Court's words than they
were intended to bear. The opinion was undoubtedly written in haste, given
the expedited timetable for consideration. It is not even clear whether the
portion of the Court's opinion that I have discussed above is meant to address
128 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502
U.S. 279, 289 (1992)) (holding that "severe" restrictions on voting must be "narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance").
129 Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
130 Id.
131 Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
132 Id.
133 See Overton, supra note 75, at 631 (noting paucity of good data on the
prevalence of voting fraud).
134 For a more detailed explanation, see Tokaji, supra note 121.
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the merits. Although the language might seem to support it, the Court cannot
seriously be read as saying that a "fear" of widespread fraud, however
unwarranted by the facts, can justify the adoption of measures that result in
the rejection of eligible voters' votes. For at the end of its analysis, the Court
does acknowledge, albeit somewhat begrudgingly, that plaintiffs have a
strong interest in exercising their fundamental right to vote.
To its credit, the Court does recognize that "the possibility that qualified
voters might be turned away from the polls would caution any district judge
to give careful consideration to the plaintiffs' challenges."' 135 Unfortunately,
the Court itself fails to give such careful consideration to the evidence put
forward by plaintiffs in the case before it.136 The irony is that the Court,
while rightly asserting the need for "confidence" in the integrity of our
electoral system, issued an opinion that instills little confidence in its
institutional capacity to handle election administration disputes.
Viewed in the most favorable light, the Supreme Court's opinion might
be read to mean that: (1) district courts should promptly provide an
explanation for their intervention in election disputes at the time that they
make those decisions; 137 and (2) courts of appeals should generally defer to
district courts' findings regarding the balance of hardships on a preliminary
injunction motion. 138 The Court is right to say that courts of appeal should
give deference to the discretion of district courts when it comes to weighing
competing harms. That is particularly true in a case involving the
administration of elections, where the inability of an appellate court to hear
evidence directly could well impede its ability to weigh the equities.
Still, the Court would have been better off declining review in the
Arizona ID case. It certainly was not necessary to correct bad law from the
Ninth Circuit, since that court's brief order made no law at all. In fact, far
from correcting bad law, the Supreme Court made some of its own. Perhaps
135 Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
136 See Gonzalez Respondents' Response to Application for Stay of Injunction
Pending Appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
Appendix thereto, Gonzalez v. State, No. 06-16702 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/gonzales%20opposition.pdf.
137 While upholding the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, its
opinion contains a gentle but unmistakable chastisement of that court for the one-month
delay in issuing findings on a preliminary injunction motion involving an impending
election. Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7 ("Despite the time-sensitive nature of the proceedings
and the pendency of a request for emergency relief in the Court of Appeals, the District
Court did not issue its findings of fact and conclusions of law until October 12."). As I
have suggested above, this implied criticism of the district court is entirely warranted.
138 Id. ("It was still necessary, as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to
give deference to the discretion of the District Court. We find no indication that it did so,
and we conclude this was error.").
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the Court viewed itself as policing an out-of-control circuit court. This
description does not fit the facts of Purcell very well, given the limited time
the Ninth Circuit had to consider the district court's findings (nine days)
before the Supreme Court joined the fray. Moreover, even if such policing
were the Court's objective, a brief order directing the Ninth Circuit to
reconsider in light of the district court's late-issued findings, along with a
reminder of the deference that district courts' discretion is owed at the
preliminary injunction stage, would have sufficed.
Unfortunately, the Court's most cogent point-that appellate courts
should generally defer to district courts' discretion in issuing preliminary
relief-is at risk of getting lost in the fog of Purcell's reasoning. The Sixth
Circuit certainly appears to have missed this point in its reversal of the
temporary restraining order (TRO) that Judge Marbley issued in the NEOCH
litigation involving Ohio's ID requirement. 139 In issuing a TRO, Judge
Marbley had weighed the evidence and determined that Ohio's vague new ID
requirements were resulting in confusion; yet, the Sixth Circuit majority
declined to defer to his discretion as Purcell suggests an appellate court
should. Instead, it relied on Purcell for the proposition that "court orders
affecting elections can themselves result in voter confusion. 1 40 While this is
undoubtedly true, it overlooks the fact that the district court in NEOCH had
found that the disruption arising from failing to issue a TRO outweighed the
disruption arising from issuing a TRO. As Judge Tarnow pointed out in
dissenting from the panel's opinion, the majority provided no good reasons
for failing to respect Judge Marbley's discretion on this point.' 4 ' And as I
have already explained, only the diligent subsequent work of Judge Marbley
and the parties-who labored to arrive at a clear and workable consent
order-averted a potentially messy post-election fight over whether to count
ballots lacking proper ID.
Judge Posner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Crawford v. Marion
County Elections Board,142 the Indiana ID case, is also a worrisome sign in
terms of Purcell's potential impact. Like the Purcell opinion that he cites in
passing, Judge Posner's breezy analysis pays little attention to either the
evidence before it or to the Court's precedent on the constitutional test
applicable to electoral practices that infringe on the right to vote. 143 It does
139 NEOCH v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2006). See supra Section III.B. for
further discussion of the NEOCH case.
140 NEOCH, 467 F.3d at 1012.
141 Id. at 1013.
142 Crawford v. Marion County Elections Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
143 For a cogent critique of Crawford, see Bob Bauer, Posner on Photo ID: The
Unbearable Cleverness of Being Wrong (Jan 5, 2007), http://www.
moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=901 (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
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not even cite Harper and relies upon assumptions regarding the impact of
Indiana's photo ID law that are not supported by the evidence of record.
144
Although it is very unlikely that Purcell influenced the Seventh Circuit
majority's disposition, the opinions share a careless approach to the evidence
and a fuzzy conception of the underlying democratic values at stake in the
voter identification debate.
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in Crawford145 and
the case will be argued in 2008. Given the Court's careless treatment of the
subject in Purcell, there is reason to be concerned about how it will deal with
this case. Much depends on how to weigh the competing harms alleged by
challengers and defenders of voter ID. There is relatively little evidence on
both sides at present, 146 though that is likely to change in years to come.
Instead of granting certiorari in Crawford, the Court should have awaited a
case presenting a more fully developed record that included empirical
research on the harms and benefits of voter identification.
Even more important than getting the facts right is getting the law right,
and here there is great reason for questioning whether the current Court is up
to the challenge. To some extent, the issues at stake in the voter ID debate
resemble those which are in play in the redistricting and campaign finance
cases that are the subject of many of the other papers in this Symposium. In
all of these cases, there is a pronounced risk that incumbent legislators will
pass laws that are designed to protect their own interests-be it personal
interests in being reelected or partisan interests in advancing the interests of
their party. Yet the Court's treatment of partisan gerrymandering and
campaign finance provides little confidence that the Court will do better
144 For example, Judge Posner's opinion speculates on the "elusive" benefits of
voting, as though to suggest that the value of exercising this fundamental right can be
reduced to a cost-benefit analysis. He proceeds to discuss the legal test applicable to voter
ID laws in cost-benefit terms. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951-52 ("The fewer the people who
will actually disfranchise themselves rather than go to the bother and, if they are not
indigent and don't have their birth certificate and so must order a copy and pay a fee, the
expense of obtaining a photo ID, the less of a showing the state need make to justify the
law."). But as set forth above, Harper does not require an empirical demonstration of an
unequal impact in order to trigger heightened scrutiny. On the alleged benefits flowing
from the state's ID requirement, Judge Posner casually brushes aside the absence of
evidence to show that there is any fraud in the state that its ID law would prevent. He
instead substitutes his own speculative explanation that "endemic underenforcement of
minor criminal laws" explains the absence of any prosecutions for voting fraud. Id. at
953. In effect, his opinion places the burden of proving a negative-namely, that there is
little or no fraud in the state's voting system-on the plaintiffs challenging ID laws.
145 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, Case No. 07-
25 (July 2, 2007), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/rokita-cert.pdf.
146 See Overton, supra note 75, at 631.
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when it comes to voter identification or other areas of election
administration. It would be far better for the Court to allow further
development of these issues in the lower courts before injecting itself into yet
another hot-button area of election administration.
There are considerable harms that could flow from further Supreme
Court intervention in election administration at this stage. Most obviously,
the Court would stand to lose the benefits of allowing the issue to percolate
in the lower courts and for clearer empirical evidence on the impact of voter
ID to emerge. Even more serious is the potential damage to the Court's
credibility that might flow from further intervention in a hot-button issue that
tends to divide legislators along party lines. When lower courts make
mistakes, their opinions do much less damage than erroneous decisions from
the Supreme Court. That is true not only because their precedential impact is
narrower, but because lower court decisions receive far less attention. By
choosing to intervene in the voter ID controversy, the Court risks reopening
wounds still raw from Bush v. Gore. The potential for further damage to the
Court's credibility-which some may believe not yet to have healed from the
blow it suffered after 2000-is considerable.
V. CONCLUSION
For legal scholars, it is tempting to focus myopically on the opinions of
the Supreme Court and disregard what is happening in the lower courts. It is
even more tempting to pay attention only to published decisions and ignore
other effects that lower court litigation is having in terms of promoting
settlement and otherwise inducing change. To ignore such effects in the area
of election administration would be to miss an important, positive aspect of
Bush v. Gore's legacy. Whatever harm to the ideal of evenhanded justice
might have arisen from the result in that case, there have been benefits to the
increased election administration litigation that followed.
The lower courts, particularly federal district courts, have done a
respectable if imperfect job of handling post-2000 election administration
disputes. The courts have generally shown an appropriate suspicion of
practices that would unequally burden democratic participation and careful
attention to the evidence regarding the true effects of such practices. Election
administration cases tend to be ones in which small differences in facts can
matter greatly in assessing such matters as whether a particular practice
imposes a "severe" burden on participation. Federal district courts are ideally
suited to sift through the evidence in such cases. They are also well-suited to
balance the competing harms arising from a pre-election injunction in a way
that is likely to be much more difficult for a faraway appellate court,
especially the Supreme Court. Moreover, lower court litigation over election
administration-while surely not an unmitigated good-has had some
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notable beneficial effects, prompting settlement in some cases and clarifying
the rules of the game in others. The law-clarifying effect of election litigation
can be especially useful when lawsuits are brought well in advance of
Election Day.
By contrast, the Supreme Court's intervention in Purcell was anything
but constructive or clarifying. Though the Court correctly recognized the
importance of deference to district court discretion in weighing the equities at
the preliminary injunction stage, its discussion of the constitutional issues at
play provides ambiguous guidance for the lower courts. The Court's opinion
also demonstrated little regard or interest in the practical realities of election
administration practices, either in Arizona or in other states that may be
implicated by Purcell's ruling. Perhaps it is their dramatic distance from the
realities of election administration-something that the Supreme Court
justices share with appellate judges like Judge Posner-that makes it
especially difficult for them to comprehend the on-the-ground implications of
their decisions in this area.
This Article has not attempted to develop a comprehensive theory of
when the Supreme Court should intervene in election administration matters.
It would certainly be imprudent to draw general lessons on this subject from
a single case. Still, Purcell illustrates the need for particular caution when the
Court intervenes in this area. That is so because of the practical complexity
and difficult-to-measure implications of such cases, as well as their
politically sensitive character. While clear rules on when to grant review are
probably impossible to draw, the Court should not generally be in the
business of granting review simply to correct a mistake, as it appears to think
it was doing in Purcell. The immense political sensitivity of issues like voter
identification and electronic voting means that missteps that the Court makes
are likely to be magnified, potentially doing considerable damage to the
institutional credibility upon which it depends.
The dangers of Supreme Court intervention in election administration are
compounded when, as in Purcell, it must act on an expedited basis. Justice
O'Connor has recently been quoted as saying of Bush v. Gore: "I don't think
what emerged in the last opinion was the court's best effort. It was operating
under a very short time frame, to say the least. Given more time, I think we
probably would've done better."' 47 Even those of us who believe there to be
a strong foundation for Bush v. Gore's equal protection reasoning must agree
with her on this point. It is a point that applies with at least the same force to
Purcell. When intervening in elections, it is vitally important-both to its
147 Michiko Kakutani, A Court No Longer Divided.- Conservatives in Triumph, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2007, at El (reviewing JAN CRAwFORD GREENBuRG, SUPREME CONFLICT:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (2007)).
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own credibility and to our democracy-that the Court always put forward its
best efforts.

